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1. Introduction 
 
Asset price behavior has important economic implications. The understanding of price behavior, can 
improve asset allocation and is a key element when addressing to one of the most important concepts for 
the Economic Science and Finance, Market Efficiency. There is a vast literature that analyses whether asset 
returns derived from the interaction of rational agents pursuing self-interest that fully incorporate all public 
information (see Cohen, 1966; Fama, 1965, 1970; Lo, 2004; Malkiel, 1985), which is widely known 
assumption of the classical theory of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). EMH advocates that, in 
efficient markets, competition will cause that public information regarding value will be fully and 
instantaneously reflected in prices (Fama, 1965). Therefore, an efficient price level must reflect all 
information available to the market. Moreover, prices are an equilibrium derived from the interaction of 
rational agents pursuing self-interest. Authors that defend market efficiency (see Fama, 1970; Samuelson, 
1965) assume that price changes are, in the end, completely random and therefore, unpredictable, an 
assumption that will be challenged in this work. 
On the other hand, the last thirty years witnessed the growing of a set of theories that advocate that agents 
are subject to “cognitive bias” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975). As stated by Griffin and Tversky in an article 
from the Cognitive Psychology Journal, “One of the major findings that has emerged from this research is 
that people are often more confident in their judgement than is warranted by the facts” (Griffin & Tversky, 
1992, p. 411). The same proposition is defined for financial markets: “In violation of Baye’s rule, individuals 
do not consider prior probabilities when making their assessments, but rather arrive at subjective 
probabilities of occurrence based on how similar, or ‘representative’, the event is to their preconceived 
notions” (Madura & Richie, 2004, p. 92). Applying this concepts to asset valuation, prices can consistently 
deviate from its intrinsic value that cannot be explained by fundamentals. Therefore, showing that market 
agents are not fully rational.  
Following the idea that agents are not fully rational, we arrive to the concept of noise, which can be described 
as the implications of human behavior that does not fit in the conventional notions of optimization (Black, 
1986). He goes on saying “Noise makes financial markets possible, but also makes them imperfect. If there 
is no noise trading, there will be very little trading in individual assets. People will hold individual assets, 
directly or indirectly, but they rarely trade them” (Black, 1986, p. 530). Following his argument, noise 
provides liquidity and mispricing that makes trading desirable. Departing from this view, the concept of 
“noise trading” was developed, which states that, uninformed agents use irrelevant information as basis for 
their trading decisions. 
Building on these ideas, using the framework of Madura & Richie (2004) as theoretical reference, we 
hypothesize that in general agents tend to overreact to public information released after the close of previous 
trading session generating predictable price change patterns. We develop an empirical study in which we 
analyze whether the first price of trading session is a result of overreaction generated by the interaction of 
noise traders. We also study the overreaction asymmetry argument, regarding positive and negative 
movements (see Caginalp, Desantis, & Sayrak, 2014; Da Costa, 1994; Hibbert et al., 2008; Kim, 2006).  
In order to study the overreaction and noise trading, we analyze the price retracement pattern conditioned 
to different trigger sizes, which are used to qualify the price movement as overreaction. We also perform an 
econometric analysis, using probit and logit regressions, to see if and how the extent of price movement, 
volatility and trading volume affect the price retracement and consequently the overreaction.    
We find evidence that, the opening price is an inefficient price level result of noise trading. We also find 
significant effects of our considered explanatory variables: move length affects negatively, while volatility 
and trading volume have a positive impact on overreaction. 
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The remaining sections are organized as follows: first the literature review, second empirical framework, 
third empirical analyses and results, and finally the conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Market Efficiency 
A basic tenet of finance, is that an asset is a right in future cash flows, therefore the value of an asset depends 
on these cash flows. The most widely known theories in asset pricing try to determine the fundamental 
(intrinsic) value of an asset, which has to be distinguished from its price that we can observe in the market. 
According to Adam Smith (1776), the observed price or market price is subject to the demand and supply 
of the asset and therefore, can significantly deviate from its intrinsic value in the short run, but converging 
to the fundamental value in the long run. This relation between intrinsic value and market price is the start 
point of the market efficiency concept. A market is said to be efficient if expectations and consequently 
prices, correctly incorporates all information available. The EMH, which is a core assumption in classical 
finance, states that prices should “fully” reflect all public information available to the market, and 
information regarding a security is immediately incorporated to its price (Fama, 1970). “In an efficient 
market, on the average, competition will cause the full effects of new information on the intrinsic value to 
be reflected instantaneously in actual prices” (Fama, 1965, p. 7). In other words, any price deviation from 
its true value would be exploited by informed traders (Arbitrageurs) trying to maximize profits leading to 
the equilibrium price again, which will be a good estimate of its intrinsic value (Fama, 1965). More 
precisely, Eugene Fama (1970) divides this concept into three different categories conditioned to the nature 
of information subset: weak-form, semi-strong form, and strong-form of market efficiency. While the weak-
form considers just historical prices, the semi-strong form tests if prices “fully” adjust to other new 
information that obviously became public (macroeconomic events, earnings reports, etc.). Finally, the 
strong-form of market efficiency accounts for the possibility of a specific group having monopolistic access 
to relevant information for price formation. He concludes that there is evidence that supports the EMH and 
therefore, “for the purposes of most investors the efficient markets model seems a good approximation to 
reality (Fama, 1970 p. 416)”. In general, building in the EMH, we can assume that market prices are a result 
of the interaction of rational agents with complete information pursuing self-interest. The Nobel Laureate 
Paul Samuelson, through his article with self-explanatory name, “Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices 
Fluctuate Randomly” (Samuelson, 1965), was one of the  first proponents to develop a consistent theoretical 
framework to show that stock prices evolve according to a random walk stochastic process. He starts the 
article proposing that in competitive markets, due to its nature, if one could be sure that a price would rise, 
it would have already risen and therefore, competitive prices would follow a random walk with no 
predictable bias. However, he emphasizes that in an empirical setting, such a theoretical proposition would 
be very hard to prove. In his words: “from a non-empirical base of axioms you never get empirical results” 
(Samuelson, 1965 p. 42) Andrew W. Lo perfectly summarizes above ideas about the EMH, “In an 
informationally efficient market, price changes must be unforecastable if they are properly anticipated, i.e., 
if they fully incorporate the information and expectations of all market participants”. He continues with “the 
more efficient the market, the more random the sequence of price changes generated by such a market, and 
the most efficient market of all is one in which price changes are completely random and unpredictable” 
(Lo, 2004 p. 2). However, in the last three decades occurred several market events, which can be defined as 
large price deviations (from its intrinsic value) for a relatively long-time period, that casted reasonable 
doubts on the above assumptions. Most of these events consisted in stock market bubbles and crashes such 
as the US stock market crash of 1987 (Dow Jones index plunged over 20% in a single day), the Japanese 
stock market bubble in early 90’s (Nikkei index almost doubled in two years, and one year later it was at 
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50% of its peak), and the bubble of US high tech stocks (driven by the internet), after reaching its peak in 
2000, saw some of the largest and profitable companies lose 80% of its value three years later.  
 
2.2 Mean Reversion and Overreaction in asset returns 
“What goes up must come down” firstly advocated by Isaac Newton in 1670, turned out to be a stylized fact 
about stock markets returns (Hillebrand, 2003). This means that reverting patterns are inherent to the human 
behavior, which is a mixed function of emotion and rationality. The Nobel Prize Robert Shiller, in his book, 
Irrational Exuberance, named after the speech of Federal Reserve ex-chairman Alan Greenspan, proposes 
that stock market prices overreact to changes in valuation. Alan Greenspan, on December 1996,  used the 
term “Irrational Exuberance” to describe the behavior of stock market investors (Shiller, 2014) suggesting 
that investors are not fully rational.  
Several studies present mean reversion as a consequence of overreaction, i.e., reversion of price behavior 
after large price movements, which also present the concept of underreaction, which can be understood as 
positive (negative) cumulative returns following large positive (negative) price movements (see Madura & 
Richie, 2004). As noted by Maheshwari & Dhankar (2014) the overreaction hypothesis states that in case 
of good news or periods of euphoria (optimism) as well as in case of bad news, market prices may react 
excessively, deviating from its value. However, after some time the stock prices revert to its fundamental 
value, suggesting an overreaction. The first work to consider the overreaction effect was De Bondt & Thaler 
(1985) in which they study the empirical case of US stock market. They found evidence that important news 
events are followed by abnormal price movements, e.g. stock prices tend to overreact. Using NYSE monthly 
data (1926-1982) they created two different portfolios, winners and losers, which consisted in stocks that 
experienced extreme appreciation (winners) and depreciation (losers) in its prices in the past five years. 
Moreover, they showed that contrarian strategies of selling “winners” and buying “losers” stocks, based on 
overreaction effect can generate excess of return, which is a significant blow in the EMH, a standard 
assumption of classical theory.   
Various studies suggest that excess of returns can be earned by investors exploiting mean reversion behavior 
or overreaction (Spierdijk, Bikker, & Hoek, 2010). Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) for example, 
generated abnormal returns also applying contrarian strategies (selling winners and buying losers), in this 
case based on short term reversals. Some works have found evidence that returns tend to show long-term 
mean reversion bias (negative autocorrelation), while in the short run they tend to show small positive serial 
correlation (underreaction) as presented by Poterba and Summers (1988). Other studies as Balvers, Wu, & 
Gilliland (2000) advocate that contrarian strategies generates abnormal returns, despite mean reversion 
evidence over long horizons is not conclusive for US stock prices, which may be a result of an absence of 
reliable long time series. Nevertheless, Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) presented a study that used relative 
strength strategy, which consists buying winners and selling losers, thus the opposite strategy of the 
contrarian strategy. They suggest that even though there is evidence of return reversals (overreaction) in the 
short-term (1 week or 1 month) and in the very long-term (3 to 5 years), is possible to retrieve excess or 
returns from a momentum (underreaction) strategy using a 3 to 12 months horizon.  
What is clear is that the presence of overreaction/underreaction phenomenon is important for an efficient 
asset allocation and ultimately to state whether there is market efficiency in stock market in the sense of 
EMH. Moreover, this switch of pattern behavior corroborates the idea that market agents are not fully 
rational. As stated by the Nobel Laureate and one of the precursors of Behavioral Economics Daniel 
Kahneman “we observed systematic biases in our own decisions, intuitive preferences that consistently 
violated the rules of rational choice.” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 12). This psychological bias, and resulting 
mispricing, can be found in the literature as price noise.  
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2.3 Noise and its Importance to Finance 
According to Fischer Black, noise is a statement of the implications of human behavior that does not fit 
conventional notions of optimization. It is what makes our market observations imperfect, regardless the 
field in Economics we are studying (Black, 1986).  Black, developed models in Finance, Econometrics, and 
Macroeconomics (see Fischer Black 1972, 1986, 1995, 1987), that were connected through a unique link, 
noise. He usually referred to these models as Equilibrium Models rather than Rational Equilibrium Models, 
mainly due to the fundamental role played by noise in such models. The importance of noise for Finance, is 
very well summarized in the following quote: “Noise makes financial markets possible, but also makes them 
imperfect. If there is no noise trading, there will be very little trading in individual assets. People will hold 
individual assets, directly or indirectly, but they rarely trade them” (Black, 1986, p. 530). Noise provides 
mispricing and market depth (liquidity) that makes trading profitably, and consequently desirable. The 
concept of noise trading was firstly exploited by (Kyle, 1985) and (Black, 1986), which consists, in 
uninformed agents trading on noise (irrelevant information) in contrast with sophisticated (informed) agents 
trading on relevant information. However, it was not clear what is noise and what is information, since all 
market participants believe they are trading based on information.  
De Long, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann (1990) designed a market model that represented a contest 
between noise (uninformed) traders driven by market sentiment, and consequently, susceptible to systematic 
psychological bias and sophisticated (informed) traders driven by rational expectations, not susceptible to 
psychological bias. In the model Arbitrageurs (sophisticated traders) may restrict their arbitrage positions 
(limited arbitrage in contrast with perfect arbitrage) due to “noise trader risk”1 pressured by their operational 
time horizon (finite). Building in the same rationale, Shleifer & Summers (1990) advocate that there are two 
types of risk that limit arbitrage. First, they consider the fundamental risk, which is derived from the 
uncertainty in the fundamentals of a specific stock or market. Let´s assume for instance, that a specific asset 
is being traded above its expected value and an Arbitrageur is selling it short. However, at some point in 
the future a better than expected result is released, this new information shifts the expected value of the 
underlying asset, resulting in a loss for this agent. The second source of risk, is the above mentioned “noise 
trader risk”, since the sophisticated trader has a specific time horizon to liquidate his position, the possibility 
that the mispricing - which is a function of noise/uninformed traders psychological bias and market power- 
may be even greater at this date. However, this implicit market power equilibrium is a weak assumption, 
since informed/Arbitrageurs (sophisticated) traders, if there are any, can be understood as institutional 
traders, that account for 80% of market transactions, and therefore would be impossible for noise traders to 
compete with them. 
 
3. Empirical Framework 
 
This section describes the empirical approach by focusing on the applied case of study, the BM&FBovespa 
and Ibovespa Futures Contract, the description of the key variables and the empirical strategy. 
 
3.1 BM&FBovespa – The Brazilian Futures and Stock Exchange 
The BM&FBovespa is the São Paulo Stock, Mercantile & Futures Exchange, a company that is a result of 
the merge of São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) and the Brazilian Mercantile and Futures Exchange 
(BM&F), i.e. the Brazilian market for securities, commodities and futures. It is one of the largest exchanges 
in the world in terms of market value, the second largest in Americas and the largest in South America. The 
trading value in Bovespa´s equity market in 2016 totaled BRL 1.84 trillion (USD 561 billion – 01/2017) 
                                                          
1 “the risk that noise traders’ beliefs will not revert to their mean for a long time and might in the meantime become even more extreme”(De Long 
et al., 1990).  
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with an average daily trading value of BRL 7.41 billion (USD 2.26 billion – 01/2017). The BM&F segment 
(securities, commodities and futures) traded the total amount of BRL 59.60 trillion (USD 18.17 trillion – 
01/2017) (BM&FBovespa, 2017). The main benchmark indicator is the Bovespa index, it is being 
broadcasted since 1968, which is a weighted theoretical portfolio with the stocks that represent 85% of the 
total of transactions and volume traded in the last twelve months, and were traded at least in 95% of trading 
days.  
The Ibovespa Futures Contract is a derivative referred in the Bovespa index, characterized by high liquidity 
(90.000 contracts traded daily – BRL 5.8 billion of daily financial volume) 2 and moderate volatility. Since 
it is a derivative, it keeps the tradability features inherent to this kind of contract. Due to its liquidity and 
tradability, an investor can open a position in the buy side or sell side, been used either for hedge or for 
speculative positions. Its specific characteristics allows sophisticated traders to perform its arbitrage 
strategies and therefore, correct for any mispricing they believe exists.  
Find below the Ibovespa Futures contract specifications considered here:   
 
1. Underlying asset: The Ibovespa index 
2. Price quotation: Index points times the Brazilian Real (R$) value of each point, as established 
by BM&F. 
3. Minimum price fluctuation:  Five index points. 
4. Contract size: The Ibovespa futures times the Brazilian Real value of each point, as established 
by BM&F. 
5. Contract months: Even-numbered months. 
6. Last trading day: The Wednesday closest to the 15th calendar day of the contract month. Should 
this day be a holiday or a non-trading day at BM&F, the last trading day shall be on the 
following business day. 
7. Day settlement of accounts (variation margin): The positions outstanding at the end of each 
session shall be marked to that day’s settlement price, as determined by BM&F rules and 
regulations. The corresponding amount shall be cash settled on the following business day. 
The variation margin shall be calculated up to and including the last trading day by the following formulas: 
 
(a) For the positions initiated on the day 
𝐴𝐷𝑡 =  (𝑃𝐴𝑡  –  𝑃𝑂) 𝑥 𝑀 𝑥 𝑁 
 
(b) For the positions outstanding on the previous day 
𝐴𝐷𝑡  =  (𝑃𝐴𝑡  –  𝑃𝐴𝑡−1) 𝑥 𝑀 𝑥 𝑁 
 
Where: 
𝐴𝐷𝑡 = the variation margin value, in Brazilian Reals, corresponding to date “t”; 
𝑃𝐴𝑡  = the daily settlement price, in index points, for the corresponding contract month on date 
“t”; 
𝑃𝑂  = the opening traded price, in index points; 
𝑀  = the Brazilian Real value of each index point, as established by BM&F; 
𝑁  = the number of contracts; 
𝑃𝐴𝑡−1  = the previous day’s settlement price, in index points, for the corresponding contract month. 
                                                          
2 Considering just the full contract. In case we consider the mini contract, which consists in a contract that represents 20% of the value of the full 
contract, the daily financial volume would reach around BRL 12 billion. 
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The variation margin value (𝐴𝐷𝑡) calculated as shown above, if positive, shall be credited to the buyer and 
debited to the seller. Should the calculation above present a negative value, it shall be debited to the buyer 
and credited to the seller. 
 
3.2 Trade Session Structure at the Open 
The active trading hours are usually from 9:00 to 17:55h 3 , however, from 8:45 to 9:00, there is the pre-
market, where an auction takes place, in which bid and ask4 orders can be placed and showed in the order 
book with no guarantee that they will be executed. It is highly important to visualize how the offer book is 
presented, in order to understand the possible effects that it may exert in a trader’s mind (noise trader). 
Considering the book offer organization, regardless the side of the book, the orders at the top are the most 
probable to be executed. The bid side is organized in ascending order, i.e. the highest bid is placed at the 
top and therefore, it has higher probability to be executed. The ask side is exactly in the opposite way, in 
descending order, it means the lowest ask will be in a situation of preference. During the auction, there are 
no other price references than the offer book and closing price of the previous day. Since, at this moment, 
all relevant information is public, this offer contest dynamics, in which, just the best bids and asks are 
rewarded with the execution, will result in an accumulation of orders towards the direction agents processed 
the information, generating a price overreaction. Most important economic events, such as interest rate 
decisions, are released before or after trading hours (when markets are closed), in order to do not cause any 
kind of speculative distress during the trading session. Even if we consider international economic events 
from major financial markets, such as US and Europe, they will be released during non-trading hours due 
to the Brazilian time zone (UTC-3). It is important to mention that there are minor economic events that are 
released during trading hours that could affect the market eventually. However, due to its restricted 
importance, in general its effects are negligible. Building on the EMH argument, that prices should reflect 
all public information immediately, would be reasonable to assume that public information should be 
already contained in the opening price. Therefore, the price at the opening, probably capture and highlight 
any psychological bias affecting traders at that moment. 
 
3.3 Price at the Close - the most important price level 
The stock price at the close is the most important price information. This anecdotal evidence is widely 
known among finance researchers and practitioners, that is supported by the amount of studies that use this 
price level as reference. Almost the totality of works that consider one price information per unit of time 
use the last price available for this time horizon, regardless the time frame considered (intra-daily, daily, 
weekly, monthly, yearly and so on). Furthermore, financial returns are usually calculated based on the last 
price available in a fashion, that is, closing price in time t minus the closing price in t-1 is equal the return 
in time t (see Bae, Chan, & Ng, 2004; Chen, 2012; Chuang, Liu, & Susmel, 2012; Darrat, Rahman, & Zhong, 
2003; Hibbert, Daigler, & Dupoyet, 2008; Shan, Taylor, & Walter, 2014; Umutlu, Akdeniz, & Altay-Salih, 
2010). It is well known that institutional traders have as function, provide liquidity to the market. Therefore, 
is reasonable to assume that institutional investors are responsible for most of market trading volume, 
specially, in a time that high frequency trading is a common practice. Nevertheless, institutional players, in 
aggregate, are responsible for 80% of trading volume (Puckett & Yan, 2011). “Institutional players place 
enormous importance on closing stock prices as benchmark of Value. Closing prices are used to calculate 
portfolio returns, tally the net asset values of mutual funds, and as a basis for certain types contracts and for 
after-hours trading” (Cushing & Madhavan, 2000). Consequently, following above affirmation, is logical to 
consider the closing price as a valid benchmark of value to develop our analysis. 
                                                          
3 On contract expiration dates the trading session closes at 17:00. 
4 The difference between bid and ask prices is the widely known as bid-ask spread.  
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3.4. Empirical Strategy  
This master thesis studies the behavior pattern of opening prices with respect to the closing price of the 
previous day. More precisely, we analyze whether the price at the open is an inefficient price level, result 
of the interaction of noise traders, i.e. traders that are reacting (overreacting) to irrelevant news (noise), and 
under which circumstances this situation happens considering some exogenous variables. Furthermore, we 
consider the hypothesis that the opening price may be a result of overreaction, showing a predictable 
behavioral pattern that can be used in a trading strategy to achieve excess of returns, therefore contradicting 
the EMH. We approach this matter, analyzing if the opening price retraces or not to the closing price of the 
previous day using a set of triggers to characterize the overreaction, and how the explanatory variables 
(difference close to open, trade volume and volatility) help to explain such dynamics. The results of this 
study may unveil interesting evidence: if price at the open is an inefficient price level, traders may tend to 
react (overreact) to unimportant news (noise), and subsequently there is a predictable behavioral pattern that 
can lead to excess of returns and asymmetric behavior with respect to positive and negative price 
movements. 
In this work, the market concept will follow De Long et al. (1990) and  Shleifer & Summers (1990) as 
theoretical reference. Furthermore, the idea of two different agents, Noise traders driven by market 
sentiment, and Sophisticated traders (Arbitrageurs) driven by rational expectations is a good approximation 
of market reality. However, the notion of a contest between these two groups, is at least naïve, since 
sophisticated traders (Arbitrageurs) are responsible to provide liquidity to the market, in a time that 
automated trading and High Frequency Trading (HFT) are a common practice. Moreover, this class of agent 
accounts for 80% of market volume (as explained previously), thus, an impossible competition for noise 
traders.  
Based in the aforementioned, is reasonable to assume three possible market dynamics taking place. The first 
scenario, as in De Long at al. (1990), can be seen as competition, i.e., noise traders versus sophisticated 
traders, which in this case, perform an arbitrage strategy, and therefore will be referred as Arbitrageurs. 
Given that Arbitrageurs are driven by rational expectations, the new information5 (irrelevant from a rational 
perspective) released previous to the trading session did not change Arbitrageurs’ short-term perception of 
value. However, as suggested by Griffin & Tversky (1992), unsophisticated (noise) traders tend to place too 
much weight on new information, affecting noise trader’s short-term measurement, consistent with agents 
driven by market sentiment. In such dynamics, given the obtained opening price (generated by noise 
traders)6 is different from the closing price in the previous day, Arbitrageurs start place arbitrage orders, 
leading the price to reach a short-run equilibrium, that is, the closing price of the previous day, explained 
by the assumption that there is no rational shift on value due to the new information available. In other 
words, a price retracement occurs, showing a mean reversion pattern motivated by the Arbitrageurs’ 
strategy, a consequence of noise trader’s overreaction to the new information, therefore, a situation where 
the price at the opening is an inefficient price level.  
The second feasible scenario, is that the new information available is relevant, changing the short-term value 
of the asset from a rational perspective.  In this case, given the opening price, generated by the interaction 
of noise traders, is different from the price at the close (previous rational measurement of value) of the 
previous day, the informed sophisticated traders (Arbitrageurs7 in the previous scenario) place their orders 
along (in the same side) with noise traders generating a momentum or trend. In this scenario, the price will 
not retrace to the price at the close of the previous day, actually, will possibly drift away, because the value 
                                                          
5 Described as noise according to Black (1986) 
6 Arbitrageurs need a price reference to further find a price deviation to trade on, therefore, is reasonable to assume that opening price is generated 
by noise traders. Moreover, there is the anecdotal evidence (widely known among traders and practitioners) that institutional traders do not trade at 
the opening, supported by 15 years of work experience with the stock, monitoring institutional players.     
7 What define an Arbitrageur is the strategy, that is, the agent must apply an arbitrage strategy, which is not the case in that scenario.  
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from a rational perspective changed. In such case, the opening price can be understood as noise traders’ 
underreaction to the new available information, and therefore, an efficient price level, at least in some extent. 
It is worth note that, this result can also be explained by an alternative scenario. Imagine that after the 
opening price formation, the sophisticated trader rationalizes about the true value of the asset and find that 
the mispricing is such that considering his operational time horizon (finite) and the extent of price 
retracement needed, an arbitrage strategy for this price deviation is too risky.8 In such situation, he would 
rather adopt a momentum strategy trying to profit from the resulting trend, consistent with the analyses of 
Shleifer & Summers (1990), categorizing a herd behavior as advocated by Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein 
(1992). This behavior is consistent with more pronounced price deviations that can be verified in the 
empirical analyses.      
 
3.5 Data, Variables and Descriptive Analyses 
 
Data 
The original data sample is from BM&FBovespa database, and consists on business days from January 2, 
2003 to December 30, 2013, totaling 2,720 observations. This period (01/2003 – 12/2013) was selected in 
order to avoid the political turbulence started 2014 that could negatively affect the time series analysis. Each 
event consists on date, opening price (𝑂), maximum price (𝑀𝑎𝑥), minimum price (𝑀𝑖𝑛), closing price (𝐶), 
negotiated financial volume and contracts negotiated in the period.  
 
Variables 
Since the aim of this work is to analyze mispricing or price deviation, we consider only the cases that there 
is a price difference form the price at the open in 𝑡 with respect to the price at the close in 𝑡 − 1. From now 
on, for the analyses and notation simplicity, the difference from the opening price in 𝑡 and the closing price 
in 𝑡 − 1, may be referred as opening gap. We start explaining the criteria used to define opening gaps and 
its closure (price retracement). Since there are many works that found overreaction asymmetry regarding 
positive and negative movements (see Caginalp, Desantis, & Sayrak, 2014; Da Costa, 1994; Hibbert et al., 
2008; Kim, 2006), we decided to differentiate between positive and negative gaps. A positive opening gap 
is created (gapposit =1) if the opening price in 𝑡 is greater than the closing price in 𝑡-1. In this case, the 
price retracement occurs (gappositf =1) if the minimum quotation in 𝑡 is less than or equal to the closing 
price in 𝑡-1. A negative gap occurs (gapneg = 1) when the opening price in 𝑡 is less than the closing price 
in 𝑡-1, it closes (gapnegf = 1) if the maximum quotation in 𝑡 is greater than or equal to the closing quotation 
in 𝑡-1. Using mathematical notation: 
 
Positive opening gap:  𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑂𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡−1 > 0    
Negative opening gap: 𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑔 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑂𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡−1 < 0 
 
Closure (price retracement) of positive gap: 𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑓 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝑡−1 
Closure (price retracement) of negative gap: 𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡 ≥ 𝐶𝑡−1  
 
Gappositf and gapnegf  are going to be the endogenous variables for the first set of regressions, in which 
we developed a probit and a logit approach. These are binary variables, assuming the value 0 if there was 
no price retracement (gap does not close) and 1 in case there was price retracement (gap close). 
                                                          
8 Consistent with the concept of noise trader risk as suggested by De Long, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann (1990) 
Diego Pérez Gatti  Master Thesis – University of Barcelona - 2017 
 
 9 
It is reasonable to assume the price retracement is a function of the retracement extension or length, i.e. 
depends on gap size. Nevertheless, gap size is expected to affect negatively the probability of price 
retracement (closing the gap), i.e. bigger the gap, smaller the probability. The gap size variable consists in 
the difference in points between the closing price in 𝑡-1 and the opening price in 𝑡. In addition, we created 
the ratio between the opening and the closing price in t-1, which captures the size in percentage terms. That 
percentage size will be used to check for different triggers size when accounting for overreaction, that is, it 
will make possible understanding how the overreaction behavior is conditioned to the retracement length. 
Volatility is one the most important feature when studying asset returns, mainly by its role when measuring 
asset risk (Bae et al., 2004; R. Y. Chou, Chou, & Liu, 2009; R. Y. Chou & Liu, 2010; Li & Hong, 2011). A 
variable that captures the volatility was imperative for this study, since at times when the market is more 
volatile, the price experiences greater variations, what implies a greater probability of overreaction. In this 
case we created the volatility variable based on price range, the price range has been increasingly used in 
the academic literature to measure volatility (H.C. Chou & Wang, 2006). The range variable is measured 
by the difference between the maximum and minimum quotation of the day divided by the previous closing 
price.  
It is well known in financial literature that trading volume is of significant importance when explaining 
price behavior and is the most used covariate when analyzing asset pricing and market risk (see Bialkowski, 
Darolles, & Le Fol, 2008; G. Caginalp & Desantis, 2008; Gunduz Caginalp & Desantis, 2011; H.-C. Chou 
& Wang, 2006; Darrat et al., 2003). It is expected that volume has a positive impact in the probability of 
price retracement, since it supports and provides consistency to price movements. Since the volume variable 
showed nonstationary behavior, we decided to create a variable (volumeHP) that would soften the stochastic 
component of the financial volume, so we used a Hodrick-Prescott filter for cyclical components, which 
according to Hodrick & Prescott (1997) can be represented as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡      for 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇.     (1) 
 
Where the time series 𝑦𝑡 is the sum of a growth component 𝑔𝑡 and cyclical component 𝑐𝑡. The measure of 
the smoothness of the {𝑔𝑡} path is the sum of the squares of its second difference. The 𝑐𝑡 are deviations 
from 𝑔𝑡, which over longtime periods, their average is near zero (Hodrick & Prescott, 1997). 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛
{𝑔𝑡}𝑡=−1
𝑇
{∑ 𝑐𝑡
2 +
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝜆 ∑ [(𝑔𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡−1) − (𝑔𝑡−1 − 𝑔𝑡−2)]
2 
𝑇
𝑡=1
}   (2) 
 
When the smoothness penalty 𝜆 ⟶ 0, 𝑔𝑡 would just be the series 𝑦𝑡 itself, whereas when 𝜆 ⟶ ∞ the 
procedure amounts to a regression on a linear time trend, that is, produces a series whose second difference 
is exactly 0 (Hamilton, 2016). 
We extend the descriptive analyses (time horizon) for five days, i.e., check for price retracement in the 
following five days (trading week) after opening the gap. For this purpose, we create two variables capturing 
if the opening price in 𝑡 retraced to closing price in 𝑡 − 1 (gap close) for the period 𝑡 up to 𝑡 + 5. In this 
case, two count variables were created, which can assume value 0 in case the price did not retrace and from 
1 up to 6 otherwise. Specifically, it will assume value of 1 (gap closed in t), 2 (closed in t+1), 3 (closed in 
t+2), 4 (closed in t+3), 5 (in t+4) and 6 if the gap closed in t+5 (working days). In order to perform this 
study, we had to create ten more variables (five different lags forward for minimum and maximum prices). 
That is, 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡+1, 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡+2, 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡+3, 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡+4, 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡+5, 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡+2, 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡+3, 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡+4 and 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡+5. 
Using these variables as references, we can follow whether the opening price retraced up to five days. Then, 
a positive gap closes if the minimum quotation in 𝑡 up to 𝑡 + 5, is less than or equal to the closing price in 
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𝑡 − 1 and a negative gap closes if the maximum quotation in 𝑡 up to 𝑡 + 5 is greater than or equal to the 
closing quotation in 𝑡 − 1.  In mathematical notation and departing from the previous situation: 
 
Positive gaps 
Closure (price retracement) in 𝑡: 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑓 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝑡−1 
Closure (price retracement) in 𝑡 + 1: 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑓 = 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡+1 ≤ 𝐶𝑡−1,  given it did not close in 𝑡. 
Closure (price retracement) in 𝑡 + 2: 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑓 = 3 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡+2 ≤ 𝐶𝑡−1,  given it did not close in 𝑡 and 𝑡 +
1. 
Closure (price retracement) in 𝑡 + 3: 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑓 = 4 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡+3 ≤ 𝐶𝑡−1,  given it did not close in 𝑡, 𝑡 + 1, 
and  𝑡 + 2. 
Closure (price retracement) in 𝑡 + 4: 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑓 = 5 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡+4 ≤ 𝐶𝑡−1,  given it did not close in 𝑡, 𝑡 + 1, 
𝑡 + 2 and 𝑡 + 3. 
Closure (price retracement) in 𝑡 + 5: 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑓 = 6 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡+5 ≤ 𝐶𝑡−1,  given it did not close in 𝑡, 𝑡 + 1, 
𝑡 + 2, 𝑡 + 3 and 𝑡 + 4. 
 
Negative gaps 
Closure (price retracement) in 𝑡: 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡 ≥ 𝐶𝑡−1 
Closure (price retracement) in 𝑡 + 1: 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓 = 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡+1 ≥ 𝐶𝑡−1, given it did not close in 𝑡. 
Closure (price retracement) in 𝑡 + 2: 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓 = 3 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡+2 ≥ 𝐶𝑡−1, given it did not close in any 
previous day. 
Closure (price retracement) in 𝑡 + 3: 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓 = 4 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡+3 ≥ 𝐶𝑡−1, given it did not close in any 
previous day. 
Closure (price retracement) in 𝑡 + 4: 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓 = 5 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡+4 ≥ 𝐶𝑡−1, given it did not close in any 
previous day. 
Closure (price retracement) in 𝑡 + 5: 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓 = 6 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑡+5 ≥ 𝐶𝑡−1, given it did not close in any 
previous day. 
 
Descriptive analyses 
Table 1 presents the summary of variables of interest. We can see that the mean size of the first price 
movement of the day is 260.2 points or 0.54%. This is a useful information since it is going to be used as 
basis for the overreaction triggers. The biggest opening price movement is 4,375 points or 9.78%, which is 
a huge movement, considering that the underlying asset is a market index, and therefore should represent 
the whole market pricing. Moreover, price movements of 10% trigger a mechanism that paralyzes the 
trading session for thirty minutes, to avoid the spread of panic situations.  The percentage range shows a 
mean of 0.0233, that is an average intraday volatility of 2.33%. The variables gappositf and gapnegf present 
mean values of 0.62 and 0.58 respectively, suggesting that lower values present higher frequency, since the 
possible values drift from 0 to 6. 
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Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
gappositf  2751 0.624864 0.92655 0 6 
gapnegf  2751 0.583788 0.900189 0 6 
sizeabs  2751 260.2328 338.0369 5 4375 
sizeperc  2751 0.0054 0.007082 7.23E-05 0.097875 
Rangeperc 2751 0.023385 0.012532 0.003577 0.122691 
volumeHP  2751 3.58E+09 1.63E+09 6.29E+08 7.05E+09 
Table 1: descriptive analyze of main variables  
 
Figures 1a and 1b contrast the percentage size against with our two main variables (gapositf and gapnegf), 
we can see that, the most extreme opening price movements (close to 10%) occurs when considering 
negative movements, an interesting evidence of asymmetric behavior. Moreover, it suggests that investors 
tend to overreact more to bad news than to good news. 
 
(a)        (b) 
 
Figure 1: scatter plot of size with respect to positive and negative gaps 
 
Figures 2a and 2b consider volatility with respect the two variables of interest. Higher volatility favors price 
retracement. We can also note that, for negative gaps there is no observation of value 0 with higher volatility, 
corroborating the idea of asymmetric behavior. It means that, whenever there is high volatility a mean 
reversion pattern appears, suggesting overreaction. 
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(a)       (b) 
 
Figure 2: scatter plot of volatility with respect to negative and positive gaps 
 
 
 
4. Empirical analyses and results 
 
4.1 Count data analyses 
By the following tables, we analyze how often the price retracement occurs conditioned to different trigger 
size. In table 2, our variables of interest are studied separately without using any trigger. We can note that, 
the table regarding positive gaps shows that in 87.93% of observations there are price retracement 
considering up to 5 days. Moreover, we can see that in 73.03% of events the reverting pattern occur intraday, 
i.e. in the same day that the gap is created. Looking to negative gaps, we find the same behavior, though 
showing a stronger mean reversion pattern. In just 8.79% of the situations there is no price retracement, 
presenting a strong support to the concept of noise traders (traders tend to trade on noise).     
 
gappositf  Freq. Percent Cum. 
 
gapnegf  Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 174 12.07 12.07 
 
0 115 8.79 8.79 
1 1,054 73.09 85.16 
 
1 991 75.71 84.49 
2 92 6.38 91.54 
 
2 97 7.41 91.9 
3 50 3.47 95.01 
 
3 47 3.59 95.49 
4 41 2.84 97.85 
 
4 27 2.06 97.56 
5 19 1.32 99.17 
 
5 20 1.53 99.08 
6 12 0.83 100 
 
6 12 0.92 100 
Total 1,442 100   
 
Total  1,309 100 
 
Table 2: variables of interest with no trigger 
 
Since most of overreaction studies the trigger used to define overreaction seems to be arbitrary, we chose 
different trigger sizes from 0.5% up to 2% to show in the following tables, 3 and 4. Even though we checked 
opening movements considering triggers up to 5%, there is a trade-off between increasing trigger and 
number of observations, that is, higher the trigger less observations we have. Despite that in general, 
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showing the same price behavior when looking to higher triggers, the asymmetric behavior pattern became 
clearer as we increase the threshold. While when accounting for positive gaps the momentum or trend 
pattern increases with the trigger, reaching 50% with a 5% trigger, for negative gaps it remains under 30%, 
clearly showing a systematic bias in traders’ behavior.  
From the tables 3 and 4, when considering positive gaps, we find that the mean reversion pattern gradually 
decreases from 87,93%(no trigger), 77.34% (0.5% trigger), 68.63% (1% trigger), 59.6% (1.5% trigger) to 
55.77% (2% trigger). When considering negative opening gaps, we found an interesting pattern, if we take 
into account just the same day the gap occurred, we find the same behavior as in positive gaps. However, if 
we consider the following five days, the price retracement level remains almost constant. It means, that the 
intraday price retracement decreases, while in the following days it increases, leaving the percentage of 
observations that do not experience mean reversion around 20%. This evidence supports the overreaction 
and noise traders’ hypothesis for negative gaps, while also corroborating for the asymmetric behavior 
pattern. 
 
 
 
 
 
Trigger 0.50% 
   
Trigger 1% 
  
gappositf  Freq. Perc Cum. 
 
gappositf  Freq. Perc Cum. 
0 116 22.66 22.66 
 
0 64 31.37 31.37 
1 254 49.61 72.27 
 
1 69 33.82 65.2 
2 52 10.16 82.42 
 
2 23 11.27 76.47 
3 37 7.23 89.65 
 
3 22 10.78 87.25 
4 28 5.47 95.12 
 
4 17 8.33 95.59 
5 17 3.32 98.44 
 
5 6 2.94 98.53 
6 8 1.56 100 
 
6 3 1.47 100 
Total  512 100   
 
Total  204 100   
         
Trigger 0.50% 
   
Trigger 1% 
  
gapnegf  Freq. Perc Cum. 
 
gapnegf  Freq. Perc Cum. 
0 74 16.55 16.55 
 
0 39 20.42 20.42 
1 232 51.9 68.46 
 
1 70 36.65 57.07 
2 63 14.09 82.55 
 
2 37 19.37 76.44 
3 32 7.16 89.71 
 
3 15 7.85 84.29 
4 21 4.7 94.41 
 
4 13 6.81 91.1 
5 16 3.58 97.99 
 
5 13 6.81 97.91 
6 9 2.01 100 
 
6 4 2.09 100 
Total  447 100   
 
Total  191 100   
Table 3: variables of interest with trigger of 0.5% (left column) and 1% (right column) 
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Trigger 1.50% 
   
Trigger  2% 
  
gappositf  Freq. Percent Cum. 
 
gappositf  Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 40 40.4 40.4 
 
0 23 44.23 44.23 
1 22 22.22 62.63 
 
1 17 32.69 76.92 
2 12 12.12 74.75 
 
2 1 1.92 78.85 
3 11 11.11 85.86 
 
3 3 5.77 84.62 
4 8 8.08 93.94 
 
4 5 9.62 94.23 
5 5 5.05 98.99 
 
5 2 3.85 98.08 
6 1 1.01 100 
 
6 1 1.92 100 
Total  99 100   
 
Total  52 100 
 
         
Trigger 1.50% 
   
Trigger  2% 
  
gapnegf  Freq. Percent Cum. 
 
gapnegf  Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 15 18.07 18.07 
 
0 8 17.02 17.02 
1 27 32.53 50.6 
 
1 13 27.66 44.68 
2 20 24.1 74.7 
 
2 13 27.66 72.34 
3 6 7.23 81.93 
 
3 4 8.51 80.85 
4 7 8.43 90.36 
 
4 4 8.51 89.36 
5 6 7.23 97.59 
 
5 3 6.38 95.74 
6 2 2.41 100 
 
6 2 4.26 100 
Total  83 100 
  
Total  47 100 
 
Table 4: variables of interest with trigger of 1.5% (left) and 2% (right) 
 
4.2 Econometric approach 
Since the aim of this work is to check for overreaction and noise trading, the empirical model consists in 
analysing the probability of intraday price retracement considering the gap size, volume and volatility 
through non-linear estimates (logit and probit). We consider as dependent variables the information whether 
the price retraced or not, and we regress it against the gap size, the trading volume and volatility. According 
Wooldridge (2012), the main difference between probit and logit specification lies on the shape (sigmoide) 
of the cumulative distribution function (cdf). While logit assumes a cdf for the standard logistic random 
variable, probit assumes a cdf for the standard normal random variable. 
 
Probit specification:   
𝑃(𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑓 = 1ǀ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒) = 𝛷(𝛼𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛾𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖)   (3) 
𝑃(𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓 = 1ǀ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒) = 𝛷(𝛼𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛾𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖)   (4) 
 
Where 𝛷 is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, which can also be expressed as the 
integral: ∫ ɸ(𝑣)𝑑𝑣
𝛼𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒+𝛽𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦+𝛾𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒+𝜀𝑖
−∞
, (Wooldridge, 2012). 
 
Logit specification: 
𝑃(𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑓 = 1ǀ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒) =
𝑒𝛼𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒+𝛽𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦+𝛾𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒+𝜀𝑖
1+𝑒𝛼𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒+𝛽𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦+𝛾𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒+𝜀𝑖
          (5) 
𝑃(𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓 = 1ǀ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒) =
𝑒𝛼𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒+𝛽𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦+𝛾𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒+𝜀𝑖
1+𝑒𝛼𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒+𝛽𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦+𝛾𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒+𝜀𝑖
          (6) 
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The logit and probit approaches are used for analyzing the intraday dynamics.  In order to capture behavior 
asymmetry in case it exists, we develop two models for each specification, a model considering just positive 
gaps and a model accounting for negative gaps.  
 
4.3 Econometric results 
For each approach (probit and logit), we present two estimations, for positive and negative gaps. 
Constructing the empirical framework, we use a threshold of 0.5% as the trigger that allowed the gap to 
qualify for the overreaction analysis.  
Due to its nature, the interpretation of binary response models become more complex and less intuitive than 
in linear models: the analysis of the coefficients allows only to determine if a certain variable has a positive 
or negative impact on the probability of the event occur, that is, only the signal is evaluated. Regarding the 
marginal effects of the explanatory variables, it is known that they are not constant, as they vary according 
to the position in the cumulative distribution function. 
In table 5, we report the results for the estimation of equations 3, 4, 5, 6, in which column (1) refers to the 
probit specification for positive gaps, column (2) to the logit specification for positive gaps, column (3) to 
the probit specification for negative gaps and finally column (4) to the logit specification for negative gaps. 
We can see that there are no major differences in fitting between the logit and probit specifications, even 
when comparing the log likelihood and information criteria, such as, AIC and BIC.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Positive gap 
probit 
Positive gap logit Negative gap probit Negative gap 
logit 
main     
sizeabs -0.00176*** -0.00293*** -0.00173*** -0.00305*** 
 (0.000225) (0.000399) (0.000303) (0.000545) 
rangeperc 36.69*** 62.21*** 30.72*** 53.79*** 
 (5.865) (10.52) (5.876) (10.62) 
volumeHP 9.91e-11** 1.68e-10** 1.56e-10*** 2.71e-10*** 
 (4.04e-11) (6.71e-11) (4.80e-11) (7.98e-11) 
_cons -0.353* -0.620* -0.431** -0.734** 
 (0.202) (0.340) (0.214) (0.354) 
N 512 512 447 447 
ll (null) -354.8757 -354.8757 -309.5134 -309.5134 
ll (model) -301.3081 -301.2653 -268.3984 -267.2994 
AIC 608.6162 608.5305 542.7968 540.5988 
BIC 621.3311 621.2455 555.1045 552.9064 
Standard errors in parentheses;  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 5: estimation results of probit and logit specifications for positive and negative gaps 
 
The variable size presents a negative coefficient, meanwhile the variables range and volume show a positive 
impact on price retracement. The results are consistent with the expectations, since all explanatory variables 
presented the expected influence on the endogenous one. Moreover, the coefficients show that the variables 
have a statistically significant effect when explaining overreaction.  
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TRUE   
Classified Close Do not close Total 
  
Positive 173 84 257 
Negative 81 174 255 
Total 254 258 512 
Sensibility 68.11% 
Specificity 67.44% 
Positive forecast value 67.32% 
Negative forecast value 68.24% 
  
False + for true ~D 32.56% 
False - for true D 31.89% 
False + for classified + 32.68% 
False - for classified - 31.76% 
  
Correctly classified 67.77% 
Table 6: Classification and prediction of positive gaps. 
 
It can be seen from table 6 that the probit model for positive gaps showed a percentage of 67.77% of gaps 
correctly classified, achieving a good predictive power as explicit in the indicators of sensitivity and 
specificity with values of 68.11% and 67.44% respectively. 
 
TRUE   
Classified Close Do not close Total 
  
Positive 171 79 250 
Negative 61 136 197 
Total 232 215 447 
Sensibility 73.11% 
Specificity 63.26% 
Positive forecast value 68.40% 
Negative forecast value 69.04% 
  
False + for true ~D 36.74% 
False - for true D 26.29% 
False + for classified + 31.60% 
False - for classified - 30.96% 
  
Correctly classified 68.68% 
Table 7: Classification and prediction of negative gaps. 
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The probit negative model presented a percentage of 68.68% of correctly classified gaps, also yielding a 
good predictive power predicting correctly 73.71% of the gaps that closed and 63.23% of the gaps that did 
not close. 
We opted by the average marginal effect because it accounts for the entire sample, although the marginal 
effect at the average has reached similar results. The variable size has a negative effect on the probability of 
the event occur, based on figures 3a and 3b, it is clear that the bigger the absolute size of the first price 
movement, smaller the probability of price retracement in both models. These results follow the expected 
effect, since the larger the window in the graph, greater the extent of the movement required to fill it. 
 
(a)        (b) 
Figure 3:  marginal effects of size for positive and negative gaps 
 
Figure 3, shows the probability of closing positive (panel a) and negative (panel b) gaps conditioned to their 
absolute size with 95% confidence interval. keeping the other independent variables at the mean, range 
(2.34%) and VolumeHP (R$ 3.86 billion), with the absolute size variable assuming the value of one hundred 
points, a probability of closure of 77.21% for positive gaps and 79.68% for negative gaps are reached, 
decreasing to 20.15% and 23.38% respectively, with the absolute size rising to a thousand points. The results 
corroborate the asymmetric behavior found on the count data analyses. 
Using the average marginal effect as basis, we arrive at the interpretation that an increase in one hundred 
points in the absolute size decreases by an average of 5.71% and 5.68% (for positive and negative gaps 
respectively) in the probability of price retracement.  
The rangeperc variable, has a positive effect on the dependent variable, we can notice that the higher its 
values, greater the probability of price retracement. Since range is a measure of volatility, it is expected that 
in moments of greater volatility the probability of price retracement will be greater. Therefore, the result 
presented meets the expectation. 
Figures 4a and 4b presents how the probability of price retracement conditioned to the range behaves with 
a 95% confidence interval. Keeping the other covariates at the mean, the range variable at the level of 1%, 
we find a probability of closure of 28.74% for positive gaps and 30.39% for negative gaps. Considering the 
volatility at 8% the probability rises to 97.77% and 94.92% respectively. According to the table of average 
marginal effects, a 1% increase in volatility increases by 11.92% and 10.09% for positive and negative gaps 
respectively the likelihood of price retracement. 
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(a)        (b) 
Figure 4: marginal effects of volatility for positive and negative gaps 
  
Figures 5a and 5b show the marginal effect of volume on the probability of price retracement with 95% IC. 
When the variable volume assumes the value of 1.5e+09, the probability is 39.35% for positive gaps and 
35.77% for negative gaps. When the volume reaches a value close to its maximum of 7.5e+09 the probability 
jumps to 62.73% and 71.65% respectively. This marginal effect analysis presents a clear asymmetric 
component; the volume affects more heavily negative than positive gaps.   
 
(a)        (b) 
Figure 5: marginal effects of trading volume for positive and negative gaps 
 
As a consequence of such results, it is possible, for example, to perform a simulation of a real market 
situation. In this way, the importance of this work can be better demonstrated. 
At the opening of the trading session shows that the future Bovespa index contract opened with a negative 
gap of two hundred points and the variables range and volume are at the mean levels with values of 2.69% 
and R $ 3.86 billion respectively. According to the model for negative gaps, there is a probability of 74.46% 
of price retracement. Therefore, in case the investor opts for buying a contract of the future Bovespa index 
at this moment, there is a probability of 74.46% of success in the transaction. This predictable pattern, which 
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can yield excess of returns if used in a trading strategy, represents a significant stroke to the EMH, since it 
assumes that price changes must be completely random and unpredictable.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The ultimate objective of this master thesis, was to check the hypothesis that the opening price is a result of 
overreaction and noise trading, and consequently an inefficient price level. Furthermore, we also intended 
to demonstrate that there are predictable patterns when studying the dynamics of price behavior at the 
opening, contradicting the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH).  
We analyse the price retracement considering different triggers. We find that the opening price is frequently 
an inefficient price level derived from the interaction of uninformed traders. This mispricing is corrected by 
sophisticated traders (responsible for 80% of trading volume) acting as Arbitrageurs leading the price to the 
equilibrium again. We can note that without using any trigger we found that 87.93% of positive and 91.21% 
of negative gaps retrace to the closing price of the previous day. Therefore, a very strong and predictable 
retracement pattern, consistent with the first scenario mentioned in the empirical strategy part. It is 
interesting to realize that, there is a very clear asymmetric behavior when accounting for positive and 
negative gaps, which is accentuated as the trigger increases. While looking to positive gaps the 
momentum/trend or herd behavior increases with the trigger, reaching 50% with a 5% trigger, for negative 
gaps this pattern remains under 30%, showing a systematic bias in trader´s behavior. The evidence that herd 
behavior increases with the trigger is consistent with the alternative scenario. It means that, Arbitrageurs 
take into account “noise trader risk” when deciding the trading strategy, since under higher price deviations, 
sophisticated traders tend to place orders along with unsophisticated traders generating a momentum or 
trend.  
From the econometric analyses, we inferred how gap size, volatility and trading volume affect the 
probability of price retracement and consequently overreaction, since price retracement is what defines the 
overreaction concept. Moreover, we found the expected relationship between endogenous and explanatory 
variables. Based on four econometric models, using two different approaches, we arrived to predictions 
permitting their use in real market situations. In such case, this work can improve asset allocation for 
individual investors, mutual funds and hedge funds for example. 
Another important contribution of this study, relies on the findings regarding price efficiency and 
psychological bias that affect investors, shedding light in the discussion regarding the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis and alternative theories, central to financial theory.  
The econometric framework used in this work, allowed the analyses of price retracement and overreaction 
in 𝑡, that is, the intraday dynamics. This feature is a limitation of this study; however, it also can be seen as 
a motivation for future works, in which we could extend the econometric analyses to five days. The initial 
intention of this master thesis was to consider as dependent variable the price retracement for five days and 
develop two more approaches, a negative binomial and survival analyses. This objective will be 
accomplished in the future.  
 
 
  
Diego Pérez Gatti  Master Thesis – University of Barcelona - 2017 
 
 20 
References 
Bae, K.-H., Chan, K., & Ng, A. (2004). Investibility and return volatility. Journal of Financial Economics, 
71(2), 239–263. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00166-1 
Balvers, R., Wu, Y., & Gilliland, E. (2000). Mean Reversion across National Stock Markets and Parametric 
Contrarian Investment Strategies. The Journal of Finance, 55(2), 745–772. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00225 
Bialkowski, J., Darolles, S., & Le Fol, G. (2008). Improving VWAP strategies: A dynamic volume 
approach. Journal of Banking and Finance, 32(9), 1709–1722. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.09.023 
Black, F. (1972). Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing. The Journal of Business, 45(3), 
444. https://doi.org/10.1086/295472 
Black, F. (1986). Noise. Journal of Finance, 41(3), 529–543. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
6261.1986.tb04513.x 
Black, F. (1987). General Equilibriium and Business Cycles. National Bureau of Economic Research, (950). 
Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w0950.pdf 
Black, F. (1995). Interest Rates as Options. The Journal of Finance, (7). Retrieved from 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2329320.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa7b066ae5dcae948a070a16f00
576514 
BM&FBovespa. (2017). Market performance. Retrieved August 1, 2017, from 
http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/en_us/news/market-performance-6.htm 
Caginalp, G., & Desantis, M. (2008). Stock price dynamics: nonlinear trend, volume, volatility, resistance 
and money supply. Quantitative Finance, 11(6), 849–861. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14697680903220356 
Caginalp, G., & Desantis, M. (2011). Nonlinearity in the dynamics of financial markets. Nonlinear Analysis: 
Real World Applications, 12, 1140–1151. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1910296 
Caginalp, G., Desantis, M., & Sayrak, A. (2014). The nonlinear price dynamics of U.S. equity ETFs. Journal 
of Econometrics, 183, 193–201. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2014.05.009 
Chen, S.-S. (2012). Revisiting the empirical linkages between stock returns and trading volume. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 36(6), 1781–1788. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.02.003 
Chou, H.-C., & Wang, D. (2006). Using Conditional Autoregressive Range Model to Forecast Volatility of 
the Stock Indices. In Proceedings of the 9th Joint Conference on Information Sciences (JCIS). 
https://doi.org/10.2991/jcis.2006.175 
Chou, R. Y., Chou, H.-C., & Liu, N. (2009). Range Volatility Models and Their Applications in Finance. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-77117-5_83 
Chou, R. Y., & Liu, N. (2010). The economic value of volatility timing using a range-based volatility model. 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34(11), 2288–2301. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2010.05.010 
Diego Pérez Gatti  Master Thesis – University of Barcelona - 2017 
 
 21 
Chuang, W.-I., Liu, H.-H., & Susmel, R. (2012). The bivariate GARCH approach to investigating the 
relation between stock returns, trading volume, and return volatility. Global Finance Journal, 23(1), 
1–15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfj.2012.01.001 
Cohen, K. J. (1966). Review: The Random Character of Stock Market Prices. The Journal of Business, 
39(4), 532–535. Retrieved from http://www.citeulike.org/group/2384/article/1204379 
Cushing, D., & Madhavan, A. (2000). Stock returns and trading at the close. Journal of Financial Markets, 
3, 45–67. Retrieved from http://ac.els-cdn.com.sire.ub.edu/S1386418199000129/1-s2.0-
S1386418199000129-main.pdf?_tid=33bb1582-6bbb-11e7-8e6e-
00000aacb360&acdnat=1500383923_2f6950e0dc42540f4fa5aa149642eebd 
Da Costa, N. C. A. (1994). Overreaction in the Brazilian stock market. Journal of Banking and Finance, 18, 
633–642. Retrieved from http://ac.els-cdn.com.sire.ub.edu/0378426694000115/1-s2.0-
0378426694000115-main.pdf?_tid=7be7b46a-714b-11e7-ad18-
00000aacb35f&acdnat=1500995647_e5b45b57805a1f201e7f7acadb3bc265 
Darrat, A. F., Rahman, S., & Zhong, M. (2003). Intraday trading volume and return volatility of the DJIA 
stocks: A note. Journal of Banking & Finance, 27(10), 2035–2043. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-
4266(02)00321-7 
De Bondt, W. F. M., & Thaler, R. (1985). American Finance Association Does the Stock Market Overreact? 
Source: The Journal of Finance, 40(3), 793–805. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2327804 
De Long, J. B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L. H., & Waldmann, R. J. (1990). Noise Trader Risk in Financial 
Markets. Source: The Journal of Political Economy, 98(4), 703–738. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2937765 
Fama, E. F. (1965). Random Walks in Stock Market Prices. Financial Analysts Journal, 21(5), 55–59. 
https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v21.n5.55 
Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient Capital Markets : A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. Journal of 
Finance, 25(2). https://doi.org/10.2307/2325486 
Froot, K. A., Scharfstein, D. S., & Stein, J. C. (1992). Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a 
Market with Short-Term Speculation. Source: The Journal of Finance THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE 
a, 47(4), 1461–1484. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2328947 
Griffin, D., & Tversky, A. (1992). The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence. 
Cognitive Psychology, 24. Retrieved from http://ac.els-cdn.com.sire.ub.edu/001002859290013R/1-
s2.0-001002859290013R-main.pdf?_tid=e3738b06-6c8a-11e7-b8e1-
00000aacb35d&acdnat=1500473123_ce55494ff3d039c45a1cdaf6c8e0fa76 
Hamilton, J. D. (2016). Why You Should Never Use the HodrickPrescott Filter. UCSD Department of 
Economics Working Paper. https://doi.org/10.3386/w23429 
Hibbert, A. M., Daigler, R. T., & Dupoyet, B. (2008). A behavioral explanation for the negative asymmetric 
return–volatility relation. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(10), 2254–2266. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.12.046 
Hillebrand, E. (2003). Mean Reversion Models of Financial Markets. Retrieved from http://elib.suub.uni-
bremen.de/diss/docs/E-Diss549_diss02.pdf 
Diego Pérez Gatti  Master Thesis – University of Barcelona - 2017 
 
 22 
Hodrick, R. J., & Prescott, E. C. (1997). Postwar U . S . Business Cycles : An Empirical Investigation. 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29(1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.2307/2953682 
Jegadeesh, N. (1990). Evidence of Predictable Behavior of Security Returns. Source: The Journal of 
Finance, 45(3), 881–898. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2328797 
Jegadeesh, N., & Titman, S. (1993). Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock 
Market Efficiency. Source: The Journal of Finance, 48(1), 65–91. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2328882 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Kim, S. (2006). Mean Reversion of Short-Horizon Stock Returns : Asymmetry Property, 137–163. 
Kyle, A. S. (1985). Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading. Econometrica, 53(6), 1315–1336. 
Lehmann, B. N. (1990). Fads, Martingales and Market Effciency. The Quaterly Journal of Economy, CV(1). 
Li, H., & Hong, Y. (2011). Financial volatility forecasting with range-based autoregressive volatility model. 
Finance Research Letters. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2010.12.002 
Lo, A. (2004). The adaptive market hypothesis: market efficiency from an evolutionary perspective. The 
Journal of Portfolio Management, 30(5), 15–29. Retrieved from 
http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~sok/papers/l/JPM2004.pdf 
Madura, J., & Richie, N. (2004). Overreaction of Exchange-Traded Funds During the bubble of 1998-2002. 
The Journal of Behavioral Finance, 5(2), 91–104. 
Maheshwari, S., & Dhankar, R. S. (2014). A Critique of Overreaction Effect in the Global Stock Markets 
over the past three decades. IOSR Journal of Business and Management Ver. V, 16(4), 2319–7668. 
Retrieved from www.iosrjournals.org 
Malkiel, B. G. (1985). A random walk down Wall Street. Norton. Retrieved from 
https://www.mendeley.com/import/?url=http://oden.cbuc.cat/mendeley/enviaamendeley.php?bibid=.
b1105887%26inst=UB%26llen=cat 
Puckett, A., & Yan, X. S. (2011). The Interim Trading Skills of Institutional Investors. The Journal of 
Finance, 66(2), 601–633. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01643.x 
Samuelson, P. A. (1965). Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly. Industrial 
Management Review. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2006.16 
Shan, Y., Taylor, S., & Walter, T. (2014). The role of “other information” in analysts’ forecasts in 
understanding stock return volatility. Review of Accounting Studies, 19(4), 1346–1392. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-013-9272-5 
Shiller, R. J. (2014). The Stock Market in Historical Perspective, 1–10. Retrieved from 
https://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s10421.pdf 
Shleifer, A., & Summers, L. (1990). The Noise Trader Approach to Finance. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 4(2), 19–33. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.4.2.19 
Diego Pérez Gatti  Master Thesis – University of Barcelona - 2017 
 
 23 
Smith, A. (1776). The Wealth of Nations: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
842. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226763750.001.0001 
Spierdijk, L., Bikker, J. A., & Hoek, P. Van Den. (2010). Mean Reversion in International Stock Markets : 
An Empirical Analysis of the 20th Century. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. In Utility, 
Probability, and Human Decision Making (pp. 141–162). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 
Umutlu, M., Akdeniz, L., & Altay-Salih, A. (2010). The degree of financial liberalization and aggregated 
stock-return volatility in emerging markets. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(3), 509–521. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.08.010 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2012). Introductory Econometrics: A modern approach (5th ed.). 
 
  
Diego Pérez Gatti  Master Thesis – University of Barcelona - 2017 
 
 24 
A Appendix 
 
Figure A 1: Scatter plot of volume and gapnegf 
 
Figure A 2: scatterplot of volume and gappositf 
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Table A 1: probit estimation for positive gaps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A 2: probit estimation for negative gaps  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.3534032   .1941384    -1.82   0.069    -.7339075    .0271011
    volumeHP     9.91e-11   4.08e-11     2.43   0.015     1.92e-11    1.79e-10
   rangeperc     36.69234   5.224267     7.02   0.000     26.45297    46.93172
     sizeabs    -.0017579   .0002273    -7.73   0.000    -.0022033   -.0013124
                                                                              
   gappositf        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -301.30808                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1509
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =     107.14
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        512
                                                                              
       _cons    -.4312963   .2142232    -2.01   0.044    -.8511661   -.0114266
    volumeHP     1.56e-10   4.61e-11     3.38   0.001     6.57e-11    2.47e-10
   rangeperc     30.72199   5.152196     5.96   0.000     20.62387    40.82011
     sizeabs    -.0017296   .0002483    -6.97   0.000    -.0022163   -.0012429
                                                                              
     gapnegf        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -268.39841                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1328
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      82.23
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        447
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Table A 1: logit estimation for positive gaps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A 4: logit estimation for negative gaps 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.6201924   .3244488    -1.91   0.056      -1.2561    .0157156
    volumeHP     1.68e-10   6.76e-11     2.49   0.013     3.58e-11    3.01e-10
   rangeperc      62.2134    9.36401     6.64   0.000     43.86028    80.56653
     sizeabs    -.0029263   .0003995    -7.33   0.000    -.0037092   -.0021434
                                                                              
   gappositf        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -301.26527                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1511
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =     107.22
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        512
                                                                              
       _cons    -.7340211   .3544916    -2.07   0.038    -1.428812   -.0392302
    volumeHP     2.71e-10   7.79e-11     3.48   0.001     1.18e-10    4.24e-10
   rangeperc     53.78697    9.32037     5.77   0.000     35.51938    72.05456
     sizeabs    -.0030532   .0004628    -6.60   0.000    -.0039603    -.002146
                                                                              
     gapnegf        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -267.29939                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1364
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      84.43
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        447
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Table A 2: measures of fit for probit of positive gaps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A 3: measures of fit for probit of negative gaps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BIC:                       -2566.453     BIC':                        -94.659
AIC:                           1.193     AIC*n:                       610.616
Count R2:                      0.678     Adj Count R2:                  0.350
Variance of y*:                1.534     Variance of error:             1.000
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2:     0.348     Efron's R2:                    0.187
Maximum Likelihood R2:         0.189     Cragg & Uhler's R2:            0.252
McFadden's R2:                 0.151     McFadden's Adj R2:             0.140
                                         Prob > LR:                     0.000
D(508):                      602.616     LR(2):                       107.135
Log-Lik Intercept Only:     -354.876     Log-Lik Full Model:         -301.308
Measures of Fit for probit of gappositf
BIC:                       -2166.637     BIC':                        -70.025
AIC:                           1.219     AIC*n:                       544.797
Count R2:                      0.687     Adj Count R2:                  0.349
Variance of y*:                1.572     Variance of error:             1.000
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2:     0.364     Efron's R2:                    0.179
Maximum Likelihood R2:         0.168     Cragg & Uhler's R2:            0.224
McFadden's R2:                 0.133     McFadden's Adj R2:             0.120
                                         Prob > LR:                     0.000
D(443):                      536.797     LR(2):                        82.230
Log-Lik Intercept Only:     -309.513     Log-Lik Full Model:         -268.398
Measures of Fit for probit of gapnegf
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Table A 7: measures of fit for logit of positive gaps 
 
 
 
Table A 8: measures of fit for logit of negative gaps 
BIC:                       -2566.538     BIC':                        -94.744
AIC:                           1.192     AIC*n:                       610.531
Count R2:                      0.676     Adj Count R2:                  0.346
Variance of y*:                4.791     Variance of error:             3.290
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2:     0.313     Efron's R2:                    0.188
Maximum Likelihood R2:         0.189     Cragg & Uhler's R2:            0.252
McFadden's R2:                 0.151     McFadden's Adj R2:             0.140
                                         Prob > LR:                     0.000
D(508):                      602.531     LR(2):                       107.221
Log-Lik Intercept Only:     -354.876     Log-Lik Full Model:         -301.265
Measures of Fit for logit of gappositf
BIC:                       -2168.835     BIC':                        -72.223
AIC:                           1.214     AIC*n:                       542.599
Count R2:                      0.689     Adj Count R2:                  0.353
Variance of y*:                5.068     Variance of error:             3.290
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2:     0.351     Efron's R2:                    0.183
Maximum Likelihood R2:         0.172     Cragg & Uhler's R2:            0.230
McFadden's R2:                 0.136     McFadden's Adj R2:             0.123
                                         Prob > LR:                     0.000
D(443):                      534.599     LR(2):                        84.428
Log-Lik Intercept Only:     -309.513     Log-Lik Full Model:         -267.299
Measures of Fit for logit of gapnegf
